EXHIBIT #7
AS RELATED TO PARAGRAPH 12
🟢PARAGRAPH 12: JOHN E. WRENN VS STATE OF MISSISSIPPI CASE # 2015-CA-00696-COA)
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JOHN E. WRENN VS STATE OF MISSISSIPPI CASE # 2015-CA-00696-COA) (PAGE 1.)
JOHN E. WRENN VS STATE OF MISSISSIPPI CASE # 2015-CA-00696-COA) (PAGE 2.)
JOHN E. WRENN VS STATE OF MISSISSIPPI CASE # 2015-CA-00696-COA) (PAGE 3.)
JOHN E. WRENN VS STATE OF MISSISSIPPI CASE # 2015-CA-00696-COA) (PAGE 4.)
JOHN E. WRENN VS STATE OF MISSISSIPPI CASE # 2015-CA-00696-COA) (PAGE 5.)
IN ( PAGE 6.) BELOW THE MISSISSIPPI SUPREME COURT'S EXPRESSED IT'S OPINION TO THE LOWER COURTS TO WHAT THE MEANING OF THE HABITUAL OFFENDER STATUTE 99-19-81 LEGISLATION IS AND HOW IT SHOULD BE DEFINED AS IT RELATES TO SENTENCING BEFORE JULY 1, 2018
In essence, the State argues that the mandatory sentence required by section 99-19-81 is not truly mandatory because the sentencing court might have concluded that a ten-year sentence was unconstitutionally cruel and unusual. This simply is not the case. (To reiterate, "sentencing under [section 99-19-81] is not discretionary," and the sentencing "judge has no alternative but to" impose the mandatory sentence required by the statute.) Courtney, 704 So.2d at 1360 (34) (quoting Harris, 527 So.2d at 651) (brackets omitted). "It is the [Llegislature's prerogative, and not this Court's" and not the sentencing court's-"to set the length of sentences." Stromas v. State, 618 So.2d 116, 123 (Miss. 1993). It is then the sentencing court's duty, in accepting a guilty plea, to ensure that the defendant understands the sentencing parameters that the Legislature has established. URCCC 8.04(A)(4)(b).
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JOHN E. WRENN VS STATE OF MISSISSIPPI CASE # 2015-CA-00696-COA) (PAGE 6.)
JOHN E. WRENN VS STATE OF MISSISSIPPI CASE # 2015-CA-00696-COA) (PAGE 7.)
